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Digest:  Vargas v. City of Salinas 
Paul A. Alarcón 
Opinion by George, C.J., with Kennard, J., Baxter, J., 
Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J.  Concurring 
Opinion by Moreno, J., with Werdegar, J. 
Issues 
(1) Whether the protections of a motion-to-strike provided in 
California’s anti-SLAPP (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation”) statute are available to a public entity or its 
officials. 
(2) Whether the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District 
correctly concluded that the “express advocacy” standard from 
section 54964 of the California Civil Code, rather than the 
standard laid out in Stanson v. Mott, controlled the distinction 
between activities which presumptively may and those which 
presumptively may not be paid for by public funds. 
(3) Whether, under the correct standard, the trial court’s 
decision to grant the City of Salinas’ anti-SLAPP motion to strike 
was proper. 
Facts 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Angelina Morfin Vargas and Mark 
Dierolf, were the proponents of a local tax-relief initiative, 
ultimately termed Measure O, which qualified for the November 
2002 ballot in the City of Salinas.1  Measure O was designed to 
reduce and finally repeal the City’s utility user tax which 
generated a substantial percentage of the city’s general fund 
budget.2  Once qualified, the Salinas City Council was required to 
either adopt the substance of the proposed initiative as an 
ordinance, submit the initiative to the voters, or direct the 
municipality’s staff to prepare a report on the impact of the 
proposed initiative should it become law.3  The city council 
elected to have a report prepared and, once the report was 
completed, decided not to adopt the initiative as an ordinance but 
 1 Vargas v. City of Salinas, 205 P.3d 207, 209 (Cal. 2009). 
 2 Id. at 210–11. 
 3 Id. at 211 (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 9212, 9215 (West 2003)). 
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rather to send it to the voters.4  Thereafter, the city council 
adopted recommendations from the city staff regarding the city 
services and programs that would be reduced or eliminated 
should Measure O pass.5 
Subsequently, the City of Salinas posted the minutes of each 
city council meeting on the city’s website, according to its regular 
practice, as well as the city’s report on the potential impact of 
Measure O, slideshows relating to Measure O from different city 
departments, and a report by the city responding to the 
alternative reductions suggested by the proponents of Measure 
O.6  Further, the city produced a one-page document describing 
Measure O, the utility user tax, and the services which would be 
reduced or eliminated.7  This document was made available to 
the public in all city libraries, city hall, and the city website.  
Finally, articles in the city newsletter regularly discussed the 
utility user tax, Measure O, and its effect on city services.8 
Plaintiffs filed suit and accused Defendants, the City of 
Salinas and its manager Dave Mora, of engaging in unlawful 
campaign activities by using public funds “to prepare and 
distribute pamphlets, newsletters and Web site materials.”9  
Defendants filed a motion to strike pursuant to California’s anti-
SLAPP statute.10  The trial court granted this motion and 
Plaintiffs appealed.11  The court of appeal found, in accordance 
with a lengthy heritage of courts of appeal decisions, that the 
anti-SLAPP statute’s protections apply to public entities and, in 
the instant case, that Defendants had established the first prong 
of the anti-SLAPP statute—that Defendants’ statements and 
actions concerned a matter of public interest.12  Further, the 
court of appeal found that Plaintiffs were unable to satisfy their 
burden of making a prima facie showing that they would likely 
succeed on the merits of the action since Defendants’ statements 
and actions were not unlawful under the “express advocacy” 
standard provided in section 54964 of the California Civil Code.13  
The court of appeal rejected the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 211–12. 
 6 Id. at 212. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at 212–13. 
 9 Id. at 213. 
 10 Id. at 213–14. 
 11 Id. at 214. 
 12 Vargas v. City of Salinas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 514–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) 
(review granted and opinion superseded), aff’d, 205 P.3d 207 (Cal. 2009). 
 13 Id. at 520–526. 
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standard articulated in Stanson, rather than section 54964, 
should control.14  Upon further appeal, the California Supreme 
Court granted Plaintiffs’ petition of review.15 
Analysis 
As a preliminary matter, the California Supreme Court 
found that the protections of California’s anti-SLAPP statute 
extend to public entities.16  The court noted that it need not 
decide whether or not “the First Amendment of the federal 
Constitution or article I, section 2 of the California Constitution 
directly protects government speech” either in general or of the 
types involved in the instant case.17 
The court considered the anti-SLAPP statute, its legislative 
history, and a related statute.18  First, subdivision (e) of the anti-
SLAPP statute, which defines an “act” deserving of anti-SLAPP 
protection, is phrased in broad terms and does not distinguish 
between private entities or individuals and public ones.19  
Further, the California Legislature stated that the anti-SLAPP 
statute was to be “construed broadly” and the legislative history 
of the provision revealed legislative concern that abusive 
lawsuits may discourage statements by public officials regarding 
public issues.20  Finally, California’s SLAPPback statute, enacted 
after the numerous courts of appeal decisions which found the 
anti-SLAPP statute to apply to public entities, expressly permits 
a public entity to bring an “action for malicious prosecution or 
abuse of process arising from the filing or maintenance of a prior 
cause of action that has been dismissed pursuant to a special 
motion to strike.”21  This statutory authorization to bring 
SLAPPback actions would be meaningless and incomprehensible 
if public entities were not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.22  
The court also summarily concluded that Defendant’s statements 
constituted “protected activity” within the meaning of the anti-
SLAPP statute because they concerned a matter of public 
interest and, therefore, that prong one of the anti-SLAPP test 
had been satisfied.23 
 14 Id. at 523–25. 
 15 Vargas, 205 P.3d at 215. 
 16 Id. at 217. 
 17 Id. at 216. 
 18 Id. at 216–17. 
 19 Id. at 216. 
 20 Id. at 217. 
 21 Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.18(b)(1) (West 2003)). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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1.  The Proper Legal Standard for Determining Whether 
Actions Relating to Elections and Ballot Measures May 
be Paid for by Public Funds 
The court compared two possible legal standards for whether 
the statements or actions of a public entity or its officers may or 
may not be paid for by public funds or utilize public resources.24  
The court of appeal accepted the bright-line “express advocacy” 
standard adopted by section 54964 of the California Civil Code 
because the appellate court believed that this statute rendered 
Stanson inapplicable since Stanson expressly limited itself to 
cases not involving clear and unmistakable language authorizing 
expenditure of public funds for campaign purposes.25  In Stanson, 
the California? Supreme Court articulated a standard which 
distinguished between public fund spending for “campaign 
purposes,” which was not allowed, and for “informational 
purposes,” which was permitted.26  In that opinion, the court also 
stated that “no hard and fast rule governs every case” and that, 
in certain cases, courts would have to make the determination 
based “upon a careful consideration of such factors as the style, 
tenor and timing of the publication.”27 
The court concluded that the court of appeal had erred in 
applying the “express advocacy” standard.28  Section 54964 does 
not “affirmatively authorize” the use of public funds for 
communications which do not expressly advocate the approval or 
rejection of a ballot measure.29  Rather, the section “simply 
prohibits a municipality’s use of public funds for communications 
that expressly advocate such a position.”30  Further, the court 
concluded that the legislative history of section 54964 did not 
support the conclusion that the legislature intended to overturn 
Stanson—the committee report explicitly mentioned Stanson but 
in no way indicated an intent to “depart from or modify” that 
decision.31  Finally, utilizing the “express advocacy” standard in 
cases like the instant one raises troubling constitutional 
concerns.32  The court noted that “[i]f a public entity could expend 
public funds for any type of election-related communication so 
long as the communication avoided ‘express words of advocacy’ 
 24 Id. at 220–28. 
 25 Vargas, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 523–25. 
 26 Vargas, 205 P.3d at 221 (quoting Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1976)). 
 27 Id. (quoting Stanson, 551 P.2d at 12) (emphasis omitted). 
 28 Id. at 228. 
 29 Id. at 224. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 225–26. 
 32 Id. at 226. 
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and did not ‘unambiguously urge[ ] a particular result’” then “the 
public entity easily could overwhelm the voters by using the 
public treasury to finance . . . campaign material containing 
messages that, while eschewing the use of express advocacy, 
nonetheless as a realistic matter effectively promote one side of 
an election.”33  Thus, because no statute clearly and 
unmistakably authorized Defendants to use public funds for 
campaign activities, the standard elucidated in Stanson applies 
to the instant case.34 
2.  Whether the Conduct of the City of Salinas and the City 
Manager Violated the Standard Articulated in Stanson 
Since no statute clearly and unambiguously authorized 
Defendants to use public funds for campaign activities, the court 
turned to the question of “whether the activities fall within the 
category of informational activities that may be funded through 
such general appropriations or, instead, constitute campaign 
activities that may not be paid for by public funds in the absence 
of such explicit authorization.”35  The court noted that neither the 
material posted on the website, the one-page document, or the 
newsletters clearly fell within the categories which Stanson 
recognized as presumptively improper—”bumper stickers, 
posters, advertising ‘floats,’ or television and radio ‘spots’ . . . [or] 
the dissemination, at public expense, of campaign literature 
prepared by private proponents or opponents of a ballot 
measure”—but the court declared this list not to be exhaustive.36 
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ contention that the “style, 
tenor, and timing” of the challenged communications violated the 
Stanson rule because they impermissibly took sides in the 
election contest.37  The court interpreted Stanson as banning a 
public entity from “taking sides” in election contests by using 
“the public treasury to mount an election campaign.”38  In the 
instant case, Defendants’ activities were not impermissible to the 
extent they merely “evaluate[d] the merits of [the] proposed 
ballot measure and [made their] views known to the public.”39 
 33 Id. (alteration in original). 
 34 Id. at 228.  The court noted that, since section 54964 does not clearly and 
unmistakably authorize Defendants to use public funds for campaigning activities, the 
court did not need to address the serious constitutional question which such an explicit 
legislative authorization would pose. Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. (alteration in original). 
 37 Id. at 228–29. 
 38 Id. at 229 (quoting Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1, 9–10 (Cal. 1976)). 
 39 Id.  Indeed, the court noted that merely by refusing to adopt the proposed 
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The court found that merely posting the reports and minutes 
of council meetings on the website, so as to make them available 
to the public, constituted permissible informative, rather than 
campaign, activity.40  Similarly, the one-page document made 
available in the city hall and libraries was not impermissible 
advocacy since the document did not “recommend how the 
electorate should vote on the ballot measure” and because its 
“style and tenor is not at all comparable to traditional campaign 
material.”41  Rather, “from the perspective of an objective 
observer, the document clearly is an informational statement 
that merely advises the public of the specific plans that the city 
council voted to implement, should Measure O be adopted.”42  
The court also found relevant the fact that the document was 
“simply made . . . available at the city clerk’s office and in public 
libraries to members of the public who sought out the 
document.”43 
Finally, the court concluded that “the City did not engage in 
impermissible campaign activity by mailing to city residents” the 
newsletter containing articles about Measure O.44  The court 
cautioned that in some cases mass mailings of material relating 
to ballot measures right before an election could constitute 
improper campaign activity.45  However, the court found 
significant the fact that the newsletter was “a regular edition” 
rather than a special edition mailed to a larger number of 
citizens than usual.46  Additionally, the “the style and tenor of 
the publication in question was entirely consistent with an 
ordinary municipal newsletter and readily distinguishable from 
traditional campaign material.”47  Thus, the articles were 
“moderate in tone and did not exhort voters with regard to how 
they should vote” and provided information “in an objective and 
nonpartisan manner.”48 
The court highlighted certain factors which contributed to its 
conclusion that Defendants’ actions were merely informational 
and not campaign activities.  First, the information 
ordinance and instead sending it to the voters, the city council could not help but reveal 
their view that the measure should fail. Id. 
 40 Id. at 230. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 231. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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communicated was primarily factual.49  Second, the statements 
“avoided argumentative or inflammatory rhetoric.”50  Third, the 
information was conveyed in a manner “consistent with 
established practice regarding use of the Web site and regular 
circulation of the city’s official newsletter.”51  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the court of appeal was correct to decide that 
Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden under prong two of the 
anti-SLAPP statute.52  Thus, the court affirmed the decision of 
the court of appeal.53 
Holding 
The court held that “a lawsuit against a public entity that 
arises from its statements or actions is potentially subject to the 
anti-SLAPP statute” and that “the campaign 
activity/informational material dichotomy set forth in Stanson 
remains the appropriate standard for distinguishing the type of 
activities that presumptively may not be paid for by public funds, 
from those activities that presumptively may be financed from 
public funds.”54  However, the court concluded that, in the 
instant case, “the appellate court reached the correct result in 
upholding the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to 
strike.”55 
Concurrence 
Justice Moreno agreed that the “express advocacy” standard 
was insufficient and that Defendants’ actions were not 
unlawful.56  However, in light of Proposition 13 passed by voters 
in 1978, he questioned whether the “concept of prohibited 
‘campaign activity’ set forth in Stanson, and reaffirmed by the 
majority meets the current needs of governance.”57  Proposition 
13 removed the power to raise local revenues from local 
legislatures to the electorate.58  “In this context, local and 
regional agencies sometimes have been specially charged with 
the task of sponsoring ballot propositions to raise revenue to fund 
various infrastructure improvements and services that are 
 49 Id. at 232. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 217, 228 (citation omitted). 
 55 Id. at 232. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 234. 
 58 Id. 
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deemed necessary.”59  Hence, difficulties might arise from 
attempting to reconcile “the funding of an active informational 
campaign to promote or defend a lawfully government-sponsored 
ballot measure” with the majority’s “informational/campaign 
activity dichotomy.”60  Of course, as the majority and Stanson 
recognized, the legislature may expressly authorize “a public 
entity to expend public funds for campaign activities or 
materials” by clearly and unmistakably granting this 
permission.61 
Legal Significance 
In Vargas, the California Supreme Court has finally 
expressly held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute applies to 
public entities and their officers or employees.  Further, the court 
has reaffirmed the rule and standard enunciated in Stanson that 
public entities may not use public resources to support campaign 
activities but may use such funds to provide the public with 
impartial information.  In rejecting the “express advocacy” 
standard, the court rejected the position that merely avoiding 
communications for or against a particular ballot measure would 
protect a public entity or its officers from lawsuits.  Additionally, 
while Stanson provided clear examples of what types of activities 
constitute “advocacy” and what are “informational,” the instant 
case provides factors to which courts may look for guidance in 
cases involving activities which do not neatly fit into the 
campaign/informational dichotomy.  These factors suggest that a 
public entity which avoids communications that are 
substantively campaign-like and does not involve procedurally 
irregular expenses or communications is likely to prevail in a 
subsequent prosecution.  However, the Vargas court’s conclusion 
that the “government may not take sides” rule, expressed in 
Stanson, only applies where the public funds are used “to mount 
an election campaign” leaves open the possibility that the court is 
actually relaxing the standard articulated in Stanson.  Future 
decisions may be required for clarity.  Finally, whether the 
California Legislature may constitutionally authorize the use of 
public funds for campaigning remains unresolved. 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 235. 
 61 Id. at 235–36.  “Of course, any such legislation would have to conform to 
constitutional constraints so as to preserve ‘the integrity of the electoral process.’” Id. at 
236. 
